(en)Vision(ing) Otherwise: Queering Visuality and Space in Lefebvre's *Production*

Eden Kinkaid
Pennsylvania State University

This article develops and extends parallels between Lefebvre's *The Production of Space* and contemporary queer thought, drawing out their shared themes of visuality, subjectivity, and differential space. For Lefebvre, the circuits producing vision, subjectivity, and space are inescapably ideological and suspect: The visual obscures social relations, dominates space, and fragments subjectivity. Yet there is still something to be said about the transformative potential of vision in *Production*. Although Lefebvre castigated vision as a hegemonic modality, and left the counter-hegemonic potential of vision rather underdeveloped, a turn toward (queer) phenomenology can supplement Lefebvre's politics of the visual and suggest pathways to a new vision for space, subjectivity, and the social. Here, I argue that the possibility of a different space and set of social relations, be it "differential" or expressly "queer," relies on an alternative mode of visuality: a way of seeing that challenges dominant modes of representation, relationality, and meaning making in space. After considering the potentials of vision in Lefebvre's account and those of queer phenomenologists, I turn to film to experiment with the potentials of a critical visual practice to queer subjectivity and space as we know it. Key Words: film, Henri Lefebvre, phenomenology, queer, visuality.

> Can this stable world serve as a springboard for advance towards a different world, which, however, will be nowhere but in this one? Which world? We do not yet know, but we do know that "nature" or "being" will form part of it.
>
> —Lefebvre (2016, 19)

> Today it's virtual, tomorrow it will be real.
>
> —Lefebvre (1970, 7)

Lefebvre's stinging indictment of modern epistemology in *The Production of Space* should serve as a precaution to any geographer or peddler of spatial representations, a warning that a way of seeing space, of knowing and representing space, could very well transform the world as we know it. For Lefebvre, Descartes' plane, Picasso's abstract gaze, the visual logic of Bauhaus, and other such visionary moments mark the dialectical progression of a history of space and representation, one in which vision and space mutually transform each other. Did Picasso's gaze herald a new era, or only signify it (Lefebvre [1974] 1991, 302)? Did Bauhaus "cause or justify a change in aesthetic perspective, or was it merely a symptom of a change in social practice" (Lefebvre [1974] 1991, 126)? Did a new vision change space, or did the transformation of the world change how and what we see, what it is to see? Lefebvre's revolutionary moment of vision, the critical question lying dormant in this historical investigation of space and representation, is this: What would it take for a

GeoHumanities, 00(00) 2018, 1–24 © Copyright 2018 by American Association of Geographers.
Initial submission, May 2016; revised submissions, January and October 2017, February 2018; final acceptance, February 2018.
Published by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

new vision, for a new way of seeing, to produce a new space and a new society? At this historical moment, or any other, how might we learn to see differently?

This article is motivated by these questions, ones that Lefebvre only hints at in *Production*. For Lefebvre, a dominant form of visuality—the Eye, the gaze—stabilizes a hegemonic mode of representation and being. Yet the circuit of connections he draws between vision, ideology, subjectivity, and space is fundamentally ambivalent, suggesting we might turn the technology of vision against homogenization and abstraction. We might find, then, in *Production*, an alternative vision, a possible pathway toward new ways of seeing and knowing space that would fundamentally transform space and its meanings.

This search for a different way of seeing cannot be separated from practices of inhabiting space otherwise, experiments in *queering space*. Lefebvre's subject of space turns out to be rather queer indeed: We find this subject navigating the strictures and contradictions of hegemonic (i.e., "straight") time and space, embodying the contradictions of representation. We find a nascent, unlikely political subject reaching for a differential space opened up by its own contradictions, its own "queer art of failure," its failure to belong to space, to see straight, to be the right kind of subject, the right kind of body (Ahmed 2006; Halberstam 2011). But too, this failure is productive, full of political potential; embodying queer subjecthood presents us with a kind of disorientation, an irreducible double vision that might yet make another space possible.

This article proceeds in this spirit, experimenting with the question of how we might learn to see differently and know space differently. By reading Lefebvre queerly, I test the potential synergies between differential space and queer embodiment. My experimental task is the mapping of the uncertain potentials and discontinuous movements though queer visuality into differential space, a task inseparable from a queer reading practice. Queer visuality, then, is an experiment, a test of interpretation, an embodied counterreading of space, subjects, and bodies, one that might rewrite the tangle of relations and meanings we call space.

I attempt such an experiment in response to a queer impulse that runs deep in Lefebvre's philosophy of space. Indeed, strands of queer phenomenological thought develop in fascinat- ing but yet undeveloped parallel with Lefebvre's project of a differential space. For these thinkers, including Ahmed, Muñoz, and Halberstam, how to access queer or differential space is indeed a problem of vision, perception, and embodiment. Like Lefebvre's project, the production of queer space requires the actualization of, the performance of, a new way of seeing and being in space. The quest for a counterspace, then, is a search for alternative circuits of meaning, relationality, and belonging, for exits from the strictures of straight space (Halberstam 2005) and this "broken-down present" (Muñoz 2009, 30), for visions through and beyond the here and now.

This article is concerned with rendering visible and visual such lines of flight that expose queer possibility as immanent, as always already present in space. To begin, I examine the role of vision in Lefebvre's history of space and, reading it alongside (queer) phenomen- ological approaches, consider the limitations of his conceptualization. I then turn to filmic space to think through the potentials of a queer visuality. Finally, I test these potentials in an analysis of Su Friedrich's short film, *Scar Tissue* ([1979] 2013). In the conclusion, I return to the ambivalent potentials of visuality, arguing that the ethos inhabiting phenomenological thought—that what is queer is always already here, a horizon within view and within reach

—serves to remind us that vision still holds potentials for new modes of embodying space and our relations to others.

A GAY SCIENCE: QUEERNESS AS EXPERIMENTALISM

What is queer in space? In thought, in representation? Originally entering theory as an umbrella term for nonnormative sexual identities (i.e., lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer [LGBTQ]), "queerness" has since become increasingly unmoored from sexuality, coming to signify nonnormative, or even antinormative positionalities in relation to dominant modes of social life (Wiegman and Wilson 2015). Yet the value of this commitment to antinormativity (and its very ontological possibility) has more recently come under interrogation (see Jagose 2015; Kirby 2015; Wiegman and Wilson 2015). These scholars argue that, given that a norm (in the Foucauldian sense) represents an averaging function, it pulls everything into its operation; the "antinormative" is always already inside the norm. Because the norm incorporates every- thing, even seemingly self-conscious reflection on gender and how to "challenge" or "subvert" it on the part of the self-described queer subject is only a meta-operation of the system of gender, which demands we always, in the end, speak to it and relate ourselves to its terms (Roof 2016, 2). Yet to say that gender is an all-incorporating discursive operation is not to say that nothing escapes it. In fact, Roof (2016) argued, the persistent need of gender to order, police, and incorporate bodies evidences the impossibility of an embodied self ever fully complying with concepts of gender, even as they proliferate and welcome us into their increasingly diverse and "liberal" fold.

The philosophical and political problem we encounter here is a familiar one: "Is there any possible way subjects can mess with the system without reiterating it?" (Roof 2016, 13). If we insist on a model of (gendered) discourse as a closed totality, and continue to look for absolute insides and outsides, mutually exclusive forms of compliance and transgression, structure and agency, the answer appears to be an eternal "no." Yet, taking a phenomenological approach to this question, we can understand that the forms of embodiment and discourse available to us—the way we "do" gender, recognize it, and talk about it as such—are the product of our individual and collective histories, pasts that are sedimented in our bodies and language, but that are potentially revised and transformed in each iteration (Butler 2011, 2015; Merleau-Ponty 2012).

This conceptual openness and lived messiness of our gendered embodiment thus troubles any simple concept or politics of queerness as antinormativity. Contemporary queer theory requires, then, a *reorientation*, a critical intellectual and political term that goes beyond simplistic and agonistic concepts of sexual and social transgression. Drawing on phenomenology, we might begin the task of articulating queerness with a departure from the mandates of definition, allowing queerness to pull in whatever direction it may. Queerness might after all be this differential movement, an affective gesture up against and away from, within and beyond the boundaries of (yet) recognizable modes of representation and embodiment.

In this spirit, I read queerness as an experimental methodology, one concerned with "the expansion of the range of the thinkable and sayable" (Eburne and Roof 2016, 175). How might we read queerness through experimentalism? Whereas queerness is considered a form yet to come, a performative art of preoccurance, a doing in futurity (Muñoz 2009), a tracing of new lines (Ahmed 2006), experimentalism is similarly "a *virtuality*, an inauguration of concrete procedures and networks that exercise potential regardless of whether or not we perceive them" (Eburne and Roof 2016, 178). Queerness and experimentalism make new things possible; both are rooted in contemporary forms, yet, too, they demonstrate "an impulse that wants to fly away from the given" (Eburne and Roof 2016, 178). Queerness as experimentalism is thus a kind of limit experience: a desire for a (yet) unrecognizable form of knowledge and embodiment that must always scramble up the scaffolding and run through the protocols of what we already know and what we already are to arrive somewhere else. Queerness as experimentalism is not antinormative then, but tests the boundaries of the norm, of representation, not to reclaim preconceived taboos and territories, but to test the potentials of the present; to imagine how one might learn to see differently; to sense new hypotheses that make new answers, a new kind of answer, possible.

This experimental impulse I call queerness is not foreign to Lefebvre's thought. Critical and imaginative, Lefebvre's ideas wager with possibility. In particular, his common resort to transductive logics is a "method of launching the here and now into a future becoming" (Merrifield 2013, 2). Lefebvre's concepts of transduction and the differential do not call on absolute outsides or antinormative practices; rather, like queer experimentalism, they attempt to locate difference and possibility in the dialectic between the present and the not-yet-here (Merrifield 2013, 33). It is this spirit, one that reaches toward utopia, but swerves and recollects in the present, that animates this experiment in the queer potentials of Lefebvre, visuality, and space.

Queer experimentalism, including Lefebvre's various experimental methodologies (e.g., transduction, metaphilosophy), must be understood then as working on and through existing categories and understandings, not as radical outsides, abstract utopias, total negativities, or ruptures. The experiment cannot dispense with the scaffolding of its own contingency—those categories, epistemologies, styles, and practices it works on and through; "what is queer is never, after all, exterior to its object" (Ahmed 2006, 106). Queerness then might be a metaphilosophical operation (Lefebvre [1974] 1991, 405), a methodology of disorientation (Ahmed 2006), an embodiment of the experiment premised not on knowledge of an absolute outside but "an improvisation that proceeds from somewhere on the other side of an unasked question" (Harney and Moten 2013, 11).

Queerness proceeds here as such a phenomenological methodology, as a lived experiment, with visuality functioning as one modality of spatial, perceptual, and political practice. Here, the joining of experimentalism and a phenomenological methodology provide "an optic through which to approach even the historicity" of visual practice and to recognize "experiments that may not have been recognizable as such, artistic endeavors whose demands on the future have yet to be realized" (Eburne and Roof 2016, 170). What is this future but a place, an actual horizon of the here and now? How might we traffic toward this horizon of possibility?

QUEERING THE VISUAL IN *PRODUCTION*

To queer Lefebvrian vision along these lines, we must first gain a sense of the role of vision in the production of space. The language of the visual is ubiquitous in *Production*. First, the visual is part and parcel of abstract space. Second, the logic of visualization produces particular forms of social practice. Third, the logic of visualization as social practice produces the subject as a "lived abstraction"(Lefebrve [1974] 1991, 314). For the most part, Lefebvre condemns the logic of visualization, and offers little direction for rethinking the visual as a counterpractice. Here I outline Lefebvre's uses of the visual in *Production* as a starting point for thinking through the possibilities of a critical visual practice and differential space.

For Lefebvre ([1974] 1991, 75, 128), visual space is synonymous with abstract space and stands as a target of critique and resistance. Just as Lefebvre ([1974] 1991, 284) describes the historical ascendance of abstract space, he alludes to the historical struggle of the visual to achieve predominance in social practice. In the same sense that abstract space conceals contradictions and eliminates difference, the logic of the visual creates the illusion of transparency while mystifying social relations. Throughout *Production*, "visual space" operates synonymously with abstract space, demonstrating the dependence of modern space on the production of a particular visual logic and practice.

Amidst this "ever-growing hegemony" of the visual, Lefebvre ([1974] 1991, 140) worries that the logic of the visual will come to dominate, if not destroy, social practice. Lefebvre repeatedly returns to the "reign of the façade over space," which he reads metaphorically and architecturally as the mystification and veiling of social relations (e.g., Lefebvre [1974] 1991, 47, 361). Similarly, he describes the emergence of perspective in landscape painting as the effect of a new relation between town and country (i.e., as an effect of the state), but also as a way of seeing integrated into social practice more broadly (Lefebvre [1974] 1991, 41). In a more abstract vein, Lefebvre cautions that the eye and the phallus have become the political "subjects" of space, coming to stand in for and perform the power of the state and a violent masculinity (Lefebvre [1974] 1991, 287). The imposition of a visual logic into space thus effects a radical reduction of lived experience while instituting a political logic that simplifies and circumscribes social and political practice into the instrumental logic of the state and its need to render space visible, readable, and intelligible.

Indeed, the real danger of the visual is that it will come to destroy the concrete subject altogether. The abstraction of the subject through technology, philosophy, and state practice will reproduce space and the subject as simulacra, shattering the subject and space into fragmented images, into signs (Lefebvre [1974] 1991, 313). The abstraction of space will shatter and fragment the body, sexuality, and desire (Lefebvre [1974] 1991, 166). Lefebvre's concern here is that as social systems and technologies (re)produce reductionist models of space and subject, they actualize them in lived experience. In other words, through projects of the state and technology, a reductionist epistemology of space and the subject is rendered philosophically and experientially "true" because it instrumentalizes and transforms space and the subject in its image (Lefebvre [1974] 1991, 312). This instrumental vision feeds back into social practice, transforming lived space such that concrete subjects come to see as the technologies see, which is ironically, a reduction of the total experience of the concrete subject in the first place.[1] Here, we see how the logic of visualization transforms space, the subject, and the modes of perception available to it, reinforcing some modes of embodiment and foreclosing others.

It is clear that, for Lefebvre, the visual (i.e., the image and the sign) is on the side of hegemonic space and violent abstraction: "the image kills. In this it is like all signs" (Lefebvre [1974] 1991, 97). "Occasionally, however," Lefebvre ([1974] 1991) cautiously ventures, "an artist's tenderness or cruelty transgresses the limits of the image. Something else altogether may then emerge, a truth and a reality answering to criteria quite different from those of exactitude, clarity, readability, and plasticity" (97). It is in this quiet opening, wherein vision might enact yet surpass its limitations and make a new space possible, that a queer visuality becomes conceivable.

Yet how could vision, how could the image or the sign possibly exceed itself? Rather than let this paradox trouble his condemning history of vision, Lefebvre resorts to granting signs an efficacy and reach that verges on total, a mastery of meaning, practice, and bodies that threatens to destroy social practice and subjectivity altogether. Yet, at the same time, the transformation of vision is central to the history of space he describes. On one hand, Lefebvre ([1974] 1991) is arguing that transformations in vision have successfully produced hegemonic modern space, whereas on the other, he argues that a certain way of looking and sensing space ("not only with the eyes . . ." [391]) will yet illuminate its contradictions and herald a new space. It seems then that vision expresses more ambivalent potentials than Lefebvre manages to convey.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL VISION

To recover this revolutionary potential of vision, it is necessary to look beyond Lefebvre's account in *Production*. Indeed, Lefebvre's treatment of vision stands to gain from more complex accounts of vision and visuality, particularly those offered by phenomenologists and feminist scholars.[2] Here, I rely mostly on the former to complicate Lefebvre's vision, although the connections between phenomenological and feminist critiques of visuality will become clear in the subsequent discussion and film analysis. By engaging phenomen- ology, particularly Merleau-Ponty's, alongside Lefebvre's critique of the visual, we can begin to find our way out of Lefebvre's ([1974] 1991) "booby trap" of visualization (313) and recover the inexhaustable possibility inherent in vision. A phenomenological approach accepts that (1) vision can never be total; (2) vision is not a transparent means of accessing the world or ready-made signs, but is instead a social practice; and (3) vision makes and remakes subjects. A phenomenological approach, functioning here as a supplement to Lefebvre's analysis, is not fundamentally at odds with it; rather, it emphasizes the same relationships Lefebvre has traced between subjects, vision, space, and social practice, but does so with the goal of activating this circuit toward new possibilities for vision, space, and subjectivity rather than consolidating a hegemonic visuality.

For Merleau-Ponty, vision or any act of perception could never be complete or total. To see anything relies on an interplay between figure and background: The selection of an object of focus requires the relegation of other possible objects to a background that forms a constitutive outside (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 289). Further, all of space cannot be available to us as from a "god's eye view" (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 267); there is necessarily a backside to our vision, a blind spot constituted by the body from which we see, and a backside to objects that we cannot totally access (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 289).[3] For Merleau-Ponty, perception is thus a grasping toward an object that could never be known to us in its fullness; any perception is always an invitation to perceive more (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 242). This is to say that what there is to be seen always necessarily exceeds our ability to see it.

This partiality of vision, and the fact that vision expresses an active relation, leads us to understand that vision is not a transparent means of accessing preconstituted objects in the world; rather, subjects produce vision through their intentional relations with the world.[4] Seeing is a motivated act; we must look to see (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 241). To see something, we have to relegate some things to the background and sustain our focus on an object, one that has yet to come into focus. By looking, by focusing our gaze, we already anticipate the presence of an object that can be focused on (one that cannot be said to exist for us yet); in this way, our gaze performs an anticipatory or "prospective activity" (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 241).

Further, individuals' visions in the present are indelibly marked by the sedimentation of a perceptual past and the pull of a future horizon. The prospective structure of the act of vision, this reaching toward a future horizon in which our focus will constitute a hold on the object, demonstrates the historicity of perception. For Merleau-Ponty (2012), in every act of focusing, the "body ties a present, a past and a future together. It secretes time" (249). This is to say that vision always emerges from a perceptual history that shapes how and what we see. Yet it is also motivated by the pull of a future in which we might be different perceptual selves, in which we have become reshaped by what we see and have come to see differently. Because perception has a history and a future, it is characterized in the present by iterability, by a repetition that is nonetheless radically open to difference. This historicity and iterability means that "every focusing act must be renewed," to sustain a particular orientation in the world. Vision then, is not a mechanical act of perception, but an intentional striving from a past toward a future that mutually constitute, but are not determinate of each other.

Just as subjects actively produce vision, vision perpetually makes and remakes subjects. This is well illustrated in Merleau-Ponty's (2012, 259) famous description of the "spatial level," in which he endeavored to explain how we sense space and, through our embodiment, render it meaningful and actionable. For Merleau-Ponty, what we might call a "subject" is in fact an individuated historical accumulation of perceptions and movements in space that produces the conditions of possibility of all future perceptions and future perceptual "selves." *Phenomenology of Perception* is full of experiments that show how vision "conjures up a subject capable of living in it"; that is, how perceptions and the spatial relations they encode that disrupt our sedimented bodily schema do something to call forth in us a different subject, a subject capable of inhabiting a queer space and disoriented perception (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 261). Vision, then, like any act of perception, can potentially unsettle our sedimented modes of perception and embodiment and remake us as subjects.

Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology allows us to imagine a vision that is radically open, potentially transformed, and potentially transforming. Along these lines, queer theorists have taken up the work of Merleau-Ponty, setting it in an explicitly political discussion about space, embodiment, and norms, a repurposing that allows us to link Lefebvre's concerns with the production of counterhegemonic space directly to a phenomenological approach. For instance, for Ahmed (2006), queer subjecthood corresponds to a certain way of inhabiting space, seeing, and desiring, one that is "slantwise" to straight modes of embodiment and is marked by a sense of disorientation. Spatial norms pertaining to gender, race, and sexuality pressure us to "straighten" our vision, and discipline nonnormative modes of embodiment, relationality, and desiring. We are expected to see only what is given and to "become straight" by "lining up" with lines that are already given (Ahmed 2006, 23). Yet Ahmed (2006, 161) recognized the potential of failing to straighten up: By remaining queer, we make new spaces possible and trace new lines of desire, relationality, and selfhood.

Muñoz (2009) was similarly concerned with developing a phenomenological account of queer subjecthood and space, one that relies in part on a queer visuality. Muñoz developed a queer subjectivity and desire that orients us toward the future in the present: a prospective vision, an anticipatory affective structure, a transductive utopian logic, which might allow us to create and inhabit livable spaces in the present. For Muñoz, visuality and futurity are inseparable: After all, "to access queer visuality we may need to squint, to strain our vision and force it to see otherwise, beyond the limited vista of the here and now" (Muñoz 2009, 22). In seeing queerness as a horizon, and invoking queer visuality and futurity as a means to access a queer space in the present, Muñoz demonstrated the queer potential of seeing space differently and differentially as an explicit phenomenological and political project.

Reading Merleau-Ponty's (2012) *Phenomenology of Perception* and contemporary queer phenomenological work alongside Lefebvre's politics of the visual, we begin to see an alternative circuit of visuality emerge, one that might yet transform the social relations we call space. We can see that the technology of vision is fundamentally ambivalent and can be exercised to different ends, some of which consolidate modes of representational and social dominance and others that offer outs from these very structures of domination. We can thus begin to think through how visuality might be reappropriated to transform space and society. This possibility of a queer visuality and a differential space—the vision, thought, and feeling of another time and space that animates and directs our desire in the present—is indeed what makes Lefebvre's theory of space a political live wire.

QUEER VISUALITY AND FILMIC SPACE

The question of learning to see differently, of cultivating a queer perceptual-political practice, is beset with paradox. For Merleau-Ponty (2012), sensing occurs on a prepersonal level. We do not consciously choose what to see; "every perception has something anon- ymous about it, this is because it takes up an acquisition that it does not question" (247). Taking up a reflective attitude toward perception—that is, attempting to "watch" or "catch" perception as it happens—leads to a certain impossibility; we cannot see ourselves in the act of seeing (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 251). When we are "geared into" perception, we lose sense of the mediation of our perception, just as we lose track of the frame of a film when pulled into its time and place; here, both the human and filmic bodies are "invisible in their own perception" (Shilina-Conte 2016, 415).

This analogy between phenomenological worlds and film is not accidental. Rather than a simple analogy, film has been taken up as a philosophical analog to phenomenology (Chamarette 2012; Yacavone 2016). Whereas we might not be able to sense ourselves sensing, we can view film as viewing: "as having visible intentions toward the objects that make up its (own) represented world" (Yacavone 2016, 165), and thus use film as a model and extension of perceptual practice. Further, we can use film to think through the production of space and the production of subjectivities. In this section, bridging conversa- tions between phenomenologies of film, film geographies, and feminist and LGBTQ film studies, I use film to engage a set of shared problematics: the relation between virtual and embodied worlds, the production of subjectivity through vision, and the imbrication of dominant social relations and productions of space. These problematics are central in thinking about queer visuality and the production of differential space.

Phenomenologies of Film

Phenomenologies of film, developed in the postwar European cinema and witnessing a resurgence in the 1990s, continue to represent a central approach to film as film studies has moved away from semiotic, psychoanalytic, and Marxist criticism (see Stadler 1990; Sobchack 1992; Marks 2000; Barker 2009; Hezekiah 2010; Chamarette 2012; Frampton 2012; Lindner 2012; Vaughan 2013; Ferencz-Flatz and Hanich 2016; Yacavone 2016). Indeed, "'phenomenology' has become a generally recognized shorthand expression for attention to more immediate sensory and expressive features of films, and to films as perceptual objects instead of, or in addition to, cognitive, narrative, and cultural-ideological ones" (Yacavone 2016, 159). Film phenomenologies have developed filmic vision as an analog to perception (and filmic worlds as an analog to phenomenal worlds), working through issues of embodiment, space, and subjectivity posed by phenomenological thought through the experience and interpretation of cinema.

In regard to geography, phenomenological approaches acknowledge that film produces worlds organized by particular spatialities and temporalities. At once, film reproduces and represents modern experiences of space and time, but also offers the potential to experience different modes of space and time, which feed back into our everyday perception (Chamarette 2012). These worlds, then, are not entirely separate from the viewing subject; rather "[c]inematic space is experienced as more or less continuous with the actual physical space of the viewer who perceptually inhabits the virtual filmic space much like any other" (Yacavone 2016, 164).

This fundamental relationality between filmic and nonfilmic worlds presents new ways of thinking through subjectivity and spectatorship in relation to film. Through the act of viewing, a viewing that is not passive, but an active grasping (Lindner 2012), a mimetic (Barker 2009) and haptic experience (Marks 2000; Bruno 2002), we come to inhabit these virtual worlds. Lindner (2012, 155) argued that "this points to possibilities for bodily identification with the image" and the inhabitation of different subject positions, object relations, and perceptions. Similarly, Chamarette (2012) argued, "theory and film provide a pivotal moment at which specific possibilities of cinematic subjectivity crystallise, even if they later evaporate and never attain the solidity of a category" (5). Filmic vision, as a form of embodiment and consciousness itself that we come to inhabit, works at the limits of our subjectivity and vision, producing "a 'dialogue' and 'dialectic' between the viewer and the experienced film as itself a 'perceiver', 'body', 'object-subject', and 'an other'" (Yacavone 2016, 173). Film, as the embodied vision of "an other" has the potential to change what we see and how we see. What is given to us in filmic vision, like that which is given to us in perception, is always a reaching toward an object and a world that exceeds us and puts demands on us to reorganize our sense of vision, embodiment, and subjectivity, to come to recognize and inhabit a new world.

Film Geographies

Film geographies have drawn on many of these same realizations in thinking through the production and signification of space in film and the interactions between film and viewing subjects. Since the 1990s, geographers have increasingly turned to film to think through problems of representation, taking seriously the dual valence of film as both a medium of representing space−time and as an active producer of experiences of space−time. Here, repre- sentation is seen not as a mirror of the real, but as an act of connecting and bringing together (Crang 2002, 25), an active performance of social relations (Deutsch 1991), and the “temporary embodiment of social processes that continually construct and deconstruct the world as we know it” (Cresswell and Dixon 2002, 3−4).

Geographers have taken interest in filmic space from a number of perspectives. They have been particularly keen on thinking through the politics of filmic renderings of landscapes, space, and time, and what they tell us about the operations of power, ideology, hegemonic cultural forms, and everyday life (Aitken and Zonn 1994; Lukinbeal and Zimmermann 2006). Themes of place, nation, identity, tourism, and memory figure prominently here (Brownrigg 2007; Remmler 2007; Harper and Rayner 2010; Roberts 2010; Leotta 2011; Isenberg 2014). Like film phenomenologists, geographers have taken the production of space in film to be a useful analog for thinking through the production of space writ large (Aitken and Dixon 2006, 331). In a similar vein as film phenomenology, film geographies are concerned with different modes of subjectivity and spectatorship (Jancovich, Faire, and Subbings 2003; Corbin 2015), considering how we consume, inhabit, and move through filmic landscapes, and how they in turn touch, transform, and move us (Bruno 2002; Cresswell and Dixon 2002; Lindner 2012). A critical geographic understanding of filmic spaces, representations, and subjectivity indeed sheds light on social and cultural processes beyond the film’s frame, insights that enrich our understanding of place, space, meaning-making, and identity that can inform critical social and spatial practice (see Mavroudi 2013; Madsen 2014).

Feminist and LGBTQ Film

Feminist and LGBTQ film scholars have long been concerned with the production of subject positions in film, underscoring the intertwinement of gendered social relations, narrative form, space, and subjectivity. For instance, Mulvey’s ([1975] 2001) naming of the “male gaze” in film—a manner of looking that objectifies and sexualizes female bodies —has been highly productive for thinking about gendered social relations and the visual in numerous disciplines, and even made it into everyday feminist parlance. The male gaze has become a target of feminist critique and a charge to action; feminist methodologies have self-consciously formed in reaction to the optics of masculinity and representation (e.g., Rose 1995, 2007), and feminist scholarship, art, and activism have taken up the opposi- tional gaze as a way to destabilize the unequal social relations of looking (e.g., Foster 1997; Hooks 2003; Fleetwood 2011; Weber 2016). Other feminist critics have urged for a more holistic, multisensory consideration of embodiment in how we understand filmic and gendered subjectivity (Bruno 2002). Feminist visualities, then, are centrally concerned with the gendered power dynamics of looking and seeing, and committed to countering a male gaze with other visions for social and sexual relations.

LGBTQ studies of film have also been concerned with the connections between subject positions and ways of seeing. Some have focused on specifically gay, lesbian, and queer modes of viewing (Burston and Richardson 1995; Lewis 1997; Farmer 2000; Gokcem 2012). Other such approaches have focused on the hegemonic modes of embodiment we inhabit through the (heterosexual) filmic gaze, and how these positions might foreclose other ways of seeing and being. For instance, Halberstam (2005) argued that narrative structures of mainstream film reinforce and reaffirm normative modes of gender, sexuality, desire, and feeling. Halberstam and others are interested in the potential of providing less familiar ways of seeing to audiences, eliciting the inhabitation of queer subject positions (e.g., Burston and Richardson 1995; Snider 2008; Boyle 2012). These critics argue that although a gay, queer, or trans gaze might present the world, desire, and bodies in a way that is initially "unrecognizable" to straight spectators, this visually forced inhabitation of a queer subject position could elicit a kind of identification that is the precursor to recognition or intersubjectivity. Thus film, we might imagine, can lead us to see things as we have never seen them before, especially when the queer subject faces "the wrong way and we are asked to share her disorientation" (Lindner 2012, 161). These scholars thus recognize that film and narrative can be structures that reproduce hegemonic forms of embodiment and gender, but also that "thoroughly scrambled gender relations might impact the dynamics of looking" (Halberstam 2005, 85).

Yet to what extent can a gay gaze, or a gay cinema, call into serious question the forms of subjecthood that queer critique has set itself against? Although this "gay gaze" makes homosexual relations visible and relatable in some sense, we might wonder if a new choice of sexualized object is sufficient to queer visuality. Is it not the modern regime of sexuality, one circumscribed by object choice and sexual identity, that we aim to queer? Does the substitution of a gay protagonist into a film narrative subvert our expectations of narrative, or is narrative and its attendant subjects already a gendered and heteronormative project (Halberstam 2005; Roof 2016)? Critics of LGBTQ cultural production highlight how gay subjects have been "straightened" to support gender binaries, normative sexuality, and consumer culture (Halberstam 2011). The takeaway from mainstream presentations of LGBTQ life is that queer desire still must be recognizable, and the terms of recognizability almost always play to heteronormative and consumerist optics. Given the problems and limitations of such presentations, to what extent can a gay gaze show us new ways of being, seeing, and relating to the world?

In evoking the term *queer visuality*, I aim to complicate and explore these questions, pushing beyond the idea that we can transpose gay protagonists into the (heternormative and gendered) narrative and aesthetic structures of mainstream film and expect this substitution to give us new structures of feeling and vision, or even bolster the ones we have. I want to see what happens to the idea of queer visuality when we place it into the context of nonrepresentational and nonnarrative film, when we look toward and inhabit the very space of film in unexpected ways. Here, reading LGBTQ film criticism through a phenomenological and geographic approach to filmic space is key: It orients us to the "background" of filmic space and filmic vision that might hold in store alternative possibilities for subjectivity and embodiment. In this context, queer visuality implies less the "antinormative" (i.e., increasingly normalized) visions of a gay subjects and their (sexual) desires per se than it questions the very terms through which objects and others become defined as such and available to us and our desires, and how these intentional relations are constitutive of space. Queer visuality is thus an attempt to reimagine the possibilities opened to us through vision and to come to terms with the historical contingency and sedimentation that makes vision, subjects, and space appear as they do, as given.

LOOKING FOR QUEER VISUALITY IN *SCAR TISSUE*

Experimental film provides a testing ground for such an interpretive practice. To consider the possibility of a queer counterreading of filmic space, I now turn to Su Friedrich's *Scar Tissue* ([1979] 2013). Su Friedrich is generally indexed as a lesbian experimentalist, although lesbianism does not necessarily figure in obvious ways in many of her works, including *Scar Tissue* (see Holmlund 1994). *Scar Tissue*'s rather disorienting depiction of gendered urban space provides an opportunity to think through the process and politics of "the frame," "the gaze," and the production of subjectivities through filmic representation, urban spatial practice, and the operations of vision itself.

Scar Tissue, a six-and-a-half-minute silent film, is composed of a series of short scenes, interspersed with black frames, depicting men and women in a public, urban setting. The camera's gaze fixates on particular body parts, never capturing a whole body. Men comfortably fill the frame, while women are often fleeing. The camera's gaze sexualizes its objects ambivalently, suggesting latent homoeroticism (Figures 1 and 2), sexual potential (Figure 3), and later, immanent violence.



FIGURE 1 [1:33] (*Scar Tissue* [1979] 2013).

FIGURE 2 [2:22] (*Scar Tissue* [1979] 2013).

The Gaze(s) in *Scar Tissue*

With the exception of two shots, we never meet the eyes of the film's subjects. In the opening scene, two men gaze at me (Figure 4). I recognize this gaze as the "male gaze," and, at once, in a moment of interpellation, recognize myself as a woman (Althusser 2006; Mulvey [1975] 2001).

The other set of eyes meet mine in the final second of one of the film's longer and more formalistically abstract scenes (Figure 5). At first, the blown-out edges of a woman's profile blur into the motion in a mirror. The movement of the woman's head and the movement of people in the mirror diverge and articulate their separateness, yet the reflection makes it difficult to tell what her gaze is following. What is her relation to the people and things we see moving across the mirror, which seem to form an extension of her body?

In the last moment, she directs her ambivalent gaze toward me. There is no ultimate directionality to her gaze: It moves about, finally glancing into the camera and simultaneously into the imaginary space in and behind the mirror. The scene calls to mind Foucault's discussion of the mirror and heterotopia:

> The mirror functions as a heterotopia, since it makes the place I occupy, whenever I look at myself in the glass, both absolutely real—it is in fact linked to all the surrounding space—and absolutely unreal, for in order to be perceived it has of necessity to pass that virtual point that is situated down there. (Foucault and Miskowiec 1986, 24)



FIGURE 3 [1:18] (*Scar Tissue* [1979] 2013).

Unlike the surrounding urban space, which does not seem to extend to women's bodies (Ahmed 2006), here the mirror blurs, extends, and reflects her body, gesturing toward other embodied possibilities of the urban, refracted, and reconfigured relations within the real and the imaginary.

Abstract Violence

As the film progresses, the camera's gaze becomes less ambivalent. Women's bodies frantically flee the frame (Figure 6); space does not extend to their shape, foreclosing the possibility of agency and action (Lindner 2012). As they begin their flight, the men's bodies begin walking quickly as a group, increasingly filling the frame. One gets the sense that a moment of violence is inescapable. Try as they might, the women cannot escape the frame, the representational space that so readily encodes their movement as the reality, the inevit- ability of sexual violence. Men's bodies take on a devious shape as they fill space with clenched fists and determined gaits (Figures 7 and 8). Scratches—made directly on the film —appear across a few frames in this sequence, suggesting that violence is of space itself, somehow of the background (Figure 8).

This sequence of flight and pursuit culminates into a moment of formal antagonism: Men's black suits finally take over the frame, reduced to blackness, whereas women's near



FIGURE 4 [0:17] (*Scar Tissue* [1979] 2013).

absence from the frame is reduced to whiteness. Blackness and whiteness, presence and absence, positive and negative space carry forth the same binary relation, the same polarized action as the bodies enact in space. Is there a beyond to this binary, this natural order? What happens in the empty spaces of the film, those blanks that produce its action and possibility? They flicker back and forth and a new scene emerges.

At this moment, it seems that violence has occurred but has passed. Yet, rather unexpectedly, the sidewalk sparkles and a woman's body casually and freely inhabits the frame, with only the suggestion—the encroaching shadow of a man's head—of the looming masculine violence of the urban (Figure 9).

The Function of Space

The manner in which bodies are figured in *Scar Tissue* demonstrates a mode of gendered social relations in urban space. Is this difference reducible to sexual difference, to the naturally swollen fullness of the masculine and the nature of feminine bodily experience as "enclosing and confining, as being positioned within space, rather than positing space" (Lindner 2012, 155)? What is it about the space these bodies occupy that allow these symbologies to attach to them and cohere? What background sustains these visual "truths" of bodies? What is the gendered



FIGURE 5 [2:06] (*Scar Tissue* [1979] 2013).

nature of space itself? This background of urban space—the space between the figures—gives shape to bodies, allowing or disallowing them, gendering bodies in space.

In her treatment of the gendered subject, Irigaray (2003) insisted on an attention to such spaces between figures, "spaces that organize the scene, blanks that sub-tend the scene's structuration and that will yet not be read as such. Or not read at all? Not seen at all? Never in truth represented or representable, though this is not to say that they have no effect upon the present scenography" (122). Here, we can read the "blanks of scene" as the space between the figures—the background of the urban that gives recognizable shapes to the gendered bodies therein—and as the black frames interspersed throughout the film. The black frames disrupt the coherence and naturalness of the urban scenes, casting the gendered ideology secreted by urban space against a semiotic blankness that might be read as possibility rather than as foreclosure. The blanks break the frame, the ground of urban space, our sociocultural and perceptual preconceptions of space that naturalize and give meaning to it (Shilina-Conte 2016, 423). This constant movement between the unmarked potentiality of space and its ideological formation suggests an outside to the ideologies of space, which are not given but produced in space. Here space is background as action: the actualization, the encounter, and embodiment of a circuit of hegemonic, spatialized meaning, but also a site of potentiality. The blank spaces thus operate as a differential logic, one that implodes the straightforward binary of (gendered) form and demonstrates abstract space's logic as one of a fabricated totality.



FIGURE 6 [2:32] (*Scar Tissue* [1979] 2013).

A METHODOLOGY OF BLANKS: READING FROM THE BACKGROUND

Indeed, the blank screens in *Scar Tissue* demand to be read. We can read them as inverting the usual relations between positive image and negative transition, exerting an optical, emotional, and cognitive pressure on the viewer, who strains in anticipation of a positive image and tries to capture its movements and meanings as it cuts off and haunts us as an afterimage (Shilina-Conte 2016, 427). The withdrawal of vision shifts sensory attention to the haptic and embodied, and cognitive attention to the imaginary and potential. As the rhythm of the blanks insinuate action but withhold it from us, "we also find ourselves reflectively *in the dark*, unsure of what has taken place and forced to reconstruct the undisclosed meaning ourselves" (Shilina-Conte 2016, 426).

Through the anonymous rendering of gendered subjects into (symbolic) bodies, *Scar Tissue* encourages us to reencounter the urban as a space of visual meaning production and practice, to see space as figuring bodies, relations, and action. At once, the background (urban space) delimits and fixes gendered meanings, giving meanings to bodies and their relations, yet at the same time, the background (as blank, as mirror, as beyond the frame) exists as a virtual space of possibility, as an outside to the ideological circuits structuring space, subjectivity, and bodies.

It is these blanks, this background, that a queer visual and interpretive practice must reckon with; rather than taking bodies, objects, and others as given, we might look instead for the



FIGURE 7 [4:52] (*Scar Tissue* [1979] 2013).

background, the constituent set of relations, that figures certain bodies and forms as what is "present," as what is given. We might ask, like Ahmed (2006), what has been relegated to the background to sustain these current visions and directions. Or like Lefebvre, we might ask what particular social order and mode of relations has been taken for granted and mystified as "merely" empty space. In either case, we are interested in discerning what operation—in perception, in space—produces some bodies, practices, and representations as "naturally" given and others as unrecognizable, queer, and out of place.

Having considered what figures this present, how historical circuits of perception, subjectivity, symbology, and bodily meaning establish what is given to our bodies and desires, we might then insist on a different future, one governed by different symbolic and embodied relations. Following Irigaray (2003) we might

> insist also and deliberately upon those *blanks* in discourse which recall the places of her exclusion and which, by their *silent plasticity* ensure the cohesion, the articulation, the coherent expansion of established forms. Reinscribe them hither and thither *as divergences*, otherwise and elsewhere than they are expected, in *ellipses* and *eclipses* that deconstruct the logical grid of the reader-writer. . . . *Overthrow syntax* by suspending its eternally teleological order, by snipping the wires, cutting the current, breaking the circuits, switching the connections. (125)



FIGURE 8 [5:15] (*Scar Tissue* [1979] 2013).

Here, Irigaray pointed to the inhabitation of these divergences as a differential movement against hegemonic social and spatial practice, as a way to disrupt the silent plasticity of hegemonic forms of gendered embodiment and subjectivity. To overthrow this syntax is not an act of destruction, but an act of tracing different circuits, circuits that are already possible and available to us as divergences.

Lefebvre converges on this imagining of differential space, of a critical practice that mobilizes the exclusions of any system and rearticulates circuits of meanings toward a different present and future. This "method of residues" is not utopian:

> The residues in question are there, *hic et nunc* [here and now]. No more is it prospective. . . . It starts from the actual, without omitting the unforeseen and unforeseeable—those residues of rational foresight that always intervene, so that the new, different from what was thought and wished for, arises from a history. It is thus act and method in act . . . It contains the idea that nothing is eternal, that nothing is completely durable. (Lefebvre 2016, 302)

Becoming attuned to, learning to see, the contradictions of space, the residues of transparent vision as a queer(ed) subject is indeed the starting point for a different space. An act of reading from the background, of mobilizing constitutive exclusions, holds a creative potential that will "reveal itself as the creator of objects, acts, and more generally, situations" (Lefebvre 2016, 302); that is, as a creator of space.



FIGURE 9 [6:25] (*Scar Tissue* [1979] 2013).

CONCLUSION

As this experimental reading of *Scar Tissue* and its technologies of visuality demonstrate, the politics of vision—its visibilities and invisibilities—are anything but monolithic, static, and inevitable. Even in the most ordinary of scenes, the "everyday," we are constantly confronted with the gaps of (visual) representation, the reflections and backsides of embodied vision. We might learn to read these ambivalent moments as solicitations to see, to imagine, and practice space otherwise.

It is with such hopes in mind that I have explored a persistent theme in Lefebvre's *Production*, that of visuality and its relation to the production of space. Although I find Lefebvre's diagnosis of a modern, masculine vision to be compelling and largely apparent, the symbolics he deploys alongside and as vision—the phallus, the signifier, the gaze—unnecessa- rily bound the politics of vision by circumscribing it within the terms of the symbolic structures he wants to resist. The myth of masculinity's all-penetrating reach, the power of its objectifying gaze, its uncontrolled, frenzied extrapolation into technologies and abstract systems, does not seem to come into question for Lefebvre. He condemns masculine vision, but ultimately fails to demystify it.

Yet we can demystify it. For some, it is demystified in the self-conscious everyday experience of living in this symbolic system's outsides, of occupying its contradictions, its residues. The possibility of a liveable queer subjecthood does something to evidence and enact the impossibility of any ostensibly complete system, any totalizing ideological circuit, be it that of gender taxonomy, patriarchal domination, or hegemonic vision. Indeed, the curious fact that we manage to recognize ourselves and each other amidst a system that misrecognizes us, the fact that we might still see something in each other, between us, something not yet here, that we might reach for the immanence of another space like a horizon before us, a horizon we already see and in doing so inhabit, all this reminds us that the future of space is fundamentally open and exists as a present to be reckoned with.

Vision, then, might yet allow us to take up a different world, to break an embodied reflex and politics of recognition that could only ever produce more of the same—the same subjects, bodies, politics, affects, relations—more of the same space. This queered vision will inevitably be blurred and out of focus, even doubled, however; it might very well remain permanently shaky and disoriented, existing in the instant when perception is about to shift, when an embodied tension and vague sense of the irreconcilable marks our vision of a world on its way to becoming something else for us (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 17).

After all, we are not beholden to haplessly see only what has been shown, what has been given to us in any given historically contingent vision; to think so is to invest too much faith in ideology, something Lefebvre inadvertently does. What is given in vision is always a function of what we have learned to recognize, what we have seen before. What remains to be seen, what other circuits of meaning vision can animate, remains an impossible excess to the strictures of hegemonic vision. In other words, hegemonic technologies of visuality—the repeated mobiliza- tions of an ideological circuit of visual and symbolic meanings, naturalized through the ostensible transparency of vision—do not exhaust the possibilities of seeing otherwise. With a queer visuality then, we might learn to not only see, but to read from the background: to look for a radically contingent here and now that is not only a product of history, but the product of a particular manner of ideologically framing the present and circumscribing the future.

It might be too soon, then, to give up on vision. We can see now that Lefebvre's history of space and representation is glaringly incomplete; that the history and future of space does not end with, but only begins with, is only taken up in, an act of radical and daring vision, a vision that, for lack of a better word, we might call queer.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Lise Nelson and Jonathan Eburne for their sustained engagement with this article and two anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback.

NOTES

1. See Lefebvre's ([1974] 1991, 313) discussion of driverless cars for a concrete example.
2. See, for example, Jones (2003).
3. See also Haraway's (1988) critique of the "god trick," vision from nowhere, and the inevitably situated nature of our knowledge about the world.
4. Again, feminist critiques of vision emphasize that vision is a social practice, one that articulates and reinforces forms of social difference (Rose 2003).

REFERENCES

Ahmed, S. 2006. *Queer phenomenology: Orientations, objects, others*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Aitken, S. C., and D. P. Dixon. 2006. Imagining geographies of film. *Erdkunde* 60 (4):326–36. doi:10.3112/erdkunde.2006.04.03.

Aitken, S. C., and L. E. Zonn, eds. 1994. *Place, power, situation and spectacle: A geography of film*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Althusser, L. 2006. Ideology and ideological state apparatuses (notes towards an investigation). *The Anthropology of the State: A Reader* 9 (1):86–98.

Barker, J. M. 2009. *The tactile eye: Touch and the cinematic experience*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Boyle, C. 2012. An ethical queer cinema? Hypervisibility and the alienated gay gaze in Ducastel and Martineua's "Ma vraie vie à Rouen." *Modern and Contemporary France* 20 (1):53–69. doi:10.1080/09639489.2011.631700.

Brownrigg, M. 2007. Hearing place: Film music, geography and ethnicity. *International Journal of Media & Cultural Politics* 3 (3):307–23. doi:10.1386/macp.3.3.307_1.

Bruno, G. 2002. *Atlas of emotion: Journeys in art, architecture, and film*. New York: Verso.

Burston, P., and C. Richardson, eds. 1995. *A queer romance: Lesbians, gay men and popular culture*. London and New York: Routledge.

Butler, J. 2011. *Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity*. London and New York: Routledge.

———. 2015. *Senses of the subject*. New York: Fordham University Press.

Chamarette, J. 2012. *Phenomenology and the future of film: Rethinking subjectivity beyond French cinema*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Corbin, A. L. 2015. *Cinematic geographies and multicultural spectatorship in America*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Crang, M. 2002. Rethinking the observer: Film, mobility, and the construction of the subject. In *Engaging film: Geographies of mobility and identity*, ed. T. Cresswell and D. Dixon, 13–31. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.

Cresswell, T., and D. Dixon. 2002. Introduction: Engaging film. In *Engaging film: Geographies of mobility and identity*, ed. T. Cresswell and D. Dixon, 1–10. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.

Deutsch, R. 1991. Boys town. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 9 (1):5–30. doi:10.1068/d090005.

Eburne, J. P., and J. Roof. 2016. Introduction: Cynegetics of experimentalism. *ASAP/Journal* 1 (2):169–81. doi:10.1353/asa.2016.0014.

Farmer, B. 2000. *Spectacular passions: Cinema, fantasy, gay male spectatorships*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Ferencz-Flatz, C., and J. Hanich. 2016. Editor's introduction: What is film phenomenology? *Studia Phaenomenologica* 16:11–61. doi:10.5840/studphaen2016161.

Fleetwood, N. R. 2011. *Troubling vision: Performance, visuality, and blackness*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Foster, G. A. 1997. *Women filmmakers of the African & Asian diaspora: Decolonizing the gaze, locating subjectivity*. Carbondale, IL: SIU Press.

Foucault, M., and J. Miskowiec. 1986. Of other spaces. *Diacritics* 16 (1):22–27. doi:10.2307/464648.

Frampton, D. 2012. *Filmosophy*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Gokcem, S. 2012. Transperance me I want to be visible: Gay gaze in Tom Ford's film *A single man. CINEJ Cinema Journal* 1 (2):86–91. doi:10.5195/CINEJ.2012.46.

Halberstam, J. 2005. *In a queer time and place*. New York: New York University Press.

———. 2011. *The queer art of failure*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Haraway, D. 1988. Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective. *Feminist Studies* 14 (3):575–99. doi:10.2307/3178066.

Harney, S., and F. Moten. 2013. *The undercommons: Fugitive planning and black study*. New York: Minor Compositions.

Harper, G., and J. Rayner, eds. 2010. *Cinema and landscape: Film, nation and cultural geography: Film, nation and cultural geography*. Bristol, UK: Intellect Books.

Hezekiah, G. A. 2010. *Phenomenology's material presence: Video, vision and experience*. Bristol, UK: Intellect Books.

Holmlund, C. 1994. Fractured fairytales and experimental identities: Looking for lesbians in and around the films of Su Friedrich. *Discourse* 17 (1):16–46.

hooks,b. 2003. The oppositional gaze: Black female spectators. In *The feminism and visual culture reader*, ed. A. Jones, 94–105. London and New York: Routledge.

Irigaray, L. 2003. Any theory of the “subject” has always been appropriated by the masculine. In *The feminist and visual culture reader*, ed. A. Jones, 119–27. London and New York: Routledge.

Isenberg, N. 2014. Vienna is no more? Film history, psycho-geography, and the great city of dreams. *Film Quart* 67 (4):67–72. doi:10.1525/fq.2014.67.4.67.

Jagose, A. 2015. The trouble with antinormativity. *Differences* 26 (1):26–47. doi:10.1215/10407391-2880591.

Jancovich, M., L. Faire, and S. Subbings. 2003. *The place of the audience: Cultural geographies of film consumption*. London: British Film Institute Publishing.

Jones, A., ed. 2003. *The feminism and visual culture reader*. London and New York: Psychology Press.

Kirby, V. 2015. Transgression: Normativity’s self-inversion. *Differences* 26 (1):96–116. doi:10.1215/10407391-2880618.

Lefebvre, H. 1970. *La révolution urbaine* [The urban revolution]. Paris: Gallimard.

———. [1974] 1991. *The production of space*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

———. 2016. *Metaphilosophy*. London: Verso.

Leotta, A. 2011. *Touring the screen: Tourism and New Zealand film geographies*. Bristol, UK: Intellect Books.

Lewis, R. 1997. Looking good: The lesbian gaze and fashion imagery. *Feminist Review* 55 (1):92–109. doi:10.1057/fr.1997.6.

Lindner, K. 2012. Situated bodies, cinematic orientations: Film and (queer) phenomenology. In *De-westernizing film studies*, ed. S. M. Ba and W. Higbee, 152–65. New York: Routledge.

Lukinbeal, C., and S. Zimmermann. 2006. Film geography: A new subfield. *Erdkunde* 60 (4):315–25. doi:10.3112/erdkunde.

Madsen, K. D. 2014. Blue Indians: Teaching the political geography of imperialism with fictional film. *Journal of Geography* 113 (2):47–57. doi:10.1080/00221341.2012.759994.

Marks, L. U. 2000. *The skin of the film: Intercultural cinema, embodiment, and the senses*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Mavroudi, E. 2013. Creating geographies of hope through film: Performing space in Palestine Israel. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 38 (4):560–71. doi:10.1111/j.1475-5661.2012.00546.x.

Merleau-Ponty, M. 2012. *Phenomenology of perception*. Trans. D. Landes. London and New York: Routledge.

Merrifield, A. 2013. *The politics of the encounter: Urban theory and protest under planetary urbanization.* Vol. 19. Athens: University of Georgia Press.

Mulvey, L. [1975] 2001. Visual pleasure and narrative cinema. In *Media and cultural studies KeyWorks*, ed. M. G. Durham and D. M. Kellner, 342–52. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Muñoz, J. E. 2009. *Cruising utopia: The then and there of queer futurity*. New York: NYU Press.

Remmler, K. 2007. Geographies of memory: Ruth Beckermann’s film aesthetics. *Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature* 31 (1):10. doi:10.4148/2334-4415.1650.

Roberts, L. 2010. Dis/embedded geographies of film: Virtual panoramas and the touristic consumption of Liverpool waterfront. *Space and Culture* 13 (1):54–74. doi:10.1177/1206331209353691.

Roof, J. 2016. *What gender is, what gender does*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Rose, G. 1995. Distance, surface, elsewhere: A feminist critique of the space of phallocentric self/knowledge. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 13 (6):761–81. doi:10.1068/d130761.

———. 2003. On the need to ask how, exactly, is geography “visual?”. *Antipode* 35 (2):212–21. doi:10.1111/anti.2003.35.issue-2.

———. 2007. *Researching visual materials: Towards a critical visual methodology*. London: Sage.

Scar Tissue. [1979] 2013. *From the films of Su Friedrich: Vol. 3. Sink or swim.* Directed by S. Friedrich. DVD. West Hollywood, CA: Stag Films and Outcast Films.

Shilina-Conte, T. 2016. How it feels: Black screen as negative event in early cinema and 9/11 films. *Studia Phaenomenologica* 16:409–38. doi:10.5840/studphaen20161615.

Snider, C. 2008. Queer persona and the gay gaze in Brokeback Mountain: Story and film. *Psychological Perspectives* 51 (1):54–69. doi:10.1080/00332920802031888.

Sobchack, V. C. 1992. *The address of the eye: A phenomenology of film experience*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Stadler, H. A. 1990. Film as experience: Phenomenological concepts in cinema and television studies. *Quarterly Review of Film and Video* 12 (3):37–50. doi:10.1080/10509209009361351.

Vaughan, H. 2013. *Where film meets philosophy: Godard, Resnais, and experiments in cinematic thinking*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Weber, B. M. 2016. Kübra Gümüşay, Muslim digital feminism and the politics of visuality in Germany. *Feminist Media Studies* 16 (1):101–16. doi:10.1080/14680777.2015.1093123.

Wiegman, R., and E. A. Wilson. 2015. Introduction: Antinormativity's queer conventions. *Differences* 26 (1):1–25. doi:10.1215/10407391-2880582.

Yacavone, D. 2016. Film and the phenomenology of art: Reappraising Merleau-Ponty on cinema as form, medium, and expression. *New Literary History* 47 (1):159–85. doi:10.1353/nlh.2016.0001.

EDEN KINKAID is a PhD Candidate studying human geography in the Departments of Geography and Women's, Gender, and Sexuality Studies at Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802. E-mail: eck5162@psu.edu. Her primary area of research concerns agricultural change, practice, and development in north India. Her secondary area of research engages the intersections of geography and queer theory and responds to poststructuralist and phenomenological problematics of the subject and space.


Volume 1, Issue 1, 2015
Routledge
GeoHumanities
Space, Place, and the Humanities
Editors
Tim Cresswell and Deborah Dixon
An Interdisciplinary Journal of the Humanities and Geography

GeoHumanities

ISSN: 2373-566X (Print) 2373-5678 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rgeo20

To cite this article: Eden Kinkaid (2018): (en)Vision(ing) Otherwise: Queering Visuality and Space in Lefebvre's Production, GeoHumanities, DOI: 10.1080/2373566X.2018.1447496

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/2373566X.2018.1447496